The authors are to be commended for their well-balanced appraisal of psychopharmacological treatments and their acceptance that it is not the panacea it is often thought to be. There are probably at least two good reasons for now publishing a review of these two books which were re-issued in 1969 but first published over a decade ago. One is the increasing popularity of and controversy surrounding the author and the other could be the sounding of the bell for yet another round of the 'autonomous self' debate sparked by the publishing of B. F. Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity. Of course, for Skinner the concept of the autonomous self is a myth which has long since been discarded by the physical sciences but rattles still in the minds of some misguided behavioural scientists.
It is probably doubtful whether Laing would even bother to climb into the ring for this round as Carl Rogers did in 1956. For Laing the self exists because he experiences it and that is all there is to it. Skinner would be just another example of one of the many inimical forces which attempt to crush the 'real self'.
Written when he was only twenty-eight years old and presumably just fresh from his analytical training, The Divided Self is the most psychoanalytically orthodox of his writings in that it deals basically with the intrapsychic world. But clearly the revolt has begun. He rejects analytic language and structures in favour of the phenomenological-existential approach, and attempts to describe in everyday language, the experience of those who are schizoid and schizophrenic.
The central ideas in this book are well known by now (at least popularly if not professionally). The schizoid person and the more severely disturbed schizophrenic people suffer from a lack of 'ontological security' -that the individual cannot take the realness, aliveness, autonomy and identity of himself and others for granted. The basic but painful defence against being engulfed, imploded or petrified is a divorce of the self from the body. The self cannot sustain the advantages hoped for in this transcended state. The dilemma is that although the self requires sustenance to keep alive it is terrified to take in anything and therefore becomes empty and desolate. Laing argues that in the ensuing rage the only way out of this dilemma is to kill the self and thereby avoid destroying what is 'there'. Thus the 'inner' self becomes itself split and loses its own identity and integrity and also loses its own realness and direct access to realness outside itself.
Thus the author says "... a patient for instance who conducted his life along relatively 'normal' lines outwardly but operated this inner split presented as his original complaint the fact that he could never have intercourse with his wife, but only with his own image of her. That is, his body had physical relations with her body, but his mental self, while this was going on, could only look on at what his body was doing and/or 'imagine' himself having intercourse with his wife as an object of his imagination".
An even more unfortunate outcome is that of the schizophrenic person whose selfexperience or body experience cannot retain identity, integrity, cohesiveness or vitality; that is, whose centre fails to hold and who deteriorates into a state of 'chaotic nonentity' with total loss of relatedness with self and others.
In his second book Self and Others, Laing attempts to answer what he left unanswered in The Divided Self; namely, what makes the individual ontologically insecure in the first place? The answer would seem to be in Sartre's famous closing line of Huis Clos, In this book he first attempts to explain difficulties posed by the concept of unconscious phantasy by criticizing the traditional model of analysis. Difficulty arises from believing in such illogical splits as subjectobject, inner-outer, mind-body. There is only experience; the others' experience can only be experienced indirectly. If experiencing the others' conscious experience is indirect the greater problem of trying to experience the others' unconscious experience can be imagined. In effect one attributes experience to the other. In between accurate attributions and the looking glass of one's own projection lies a whole science which, according to the author, has hardly been touched; namely, the science of interpersonal experience. Analytic structures and forces to explain the unconscious appear clumsy without attention being paid to the multiple layers of experiencing the other.
In the chapter on phantasy and communication, Laing shows great faith in private experience. The danger is that one can be seduced from one's private and presumably more accurate experience into social phantasy systems, which Bion has called the 'numbing feeling of reality', with the subsequent loss of one's own identity in the process: "The 'normal' state of affairs is to be so immersed in one's immersion in social phantasy systems that one takes them to be real."
This position is a central one, for indeed the remainder of the book is an account of how individuals are lulled into a false sense of reality; that is, false or untenable positions, by fooling themselves or having others do it. The latter relies heavily on the work of North American studies of families, particularly the double bind theory. The titles of Part Two of Self and Others, (Forms of Interpersonal Action) give a good idea of the subject matter. These are: complimentary identity; confirmation and disconfirmation; collusion; false and untenable positions; attributions and injunctions. Laing illustrates his points by clinical vignettes, drama and the novel. For example, collusion, the game of mutual self deception is illustrated by Sartre's No Exit and Genet's The Balcony; the problem of injunctions and attributions is illustrated from Dostoyevski -Pulcheria Raskolnikov's devastating letter to her son which eventually leads to his crime and punishment.
Those familiar only with Laing's later extreme 'conspiratorial' and 'psychedelic' models of schizophrenia have probably dismissed him as being rather eccentric and not very important and, based on the recent work alone, they are probably quite correct. But in his first two books Laing is at his most credible. He has a profound empathic understanding of the schizoid phenomena. While his work is not particularly original and a well-trained psychiatrist will not be likely to abandon his phenothiazines because of it, nevertheless he is a persuasive writer and provides a cognitive framework which should strike chords in any therapist who has tried to work closely with such patients. The fact that thousands have identified with his descriptions to the extent that they have elevated him to the status of a cult figure cannot be ignored by any serious students of human behaviour. The various papers are informative about the 'drug scene' in North America (generally the United States) and about attempts by various agencies and groups to meet the challenges of understanding and treating the people and the phenomena. There is a distinct emphasis on the use of marijuana and heroin. In this book there are sociologic perspectives, well-documented attempts to cope with growing treatment needs, clear discussions of some of the definitions and concepts involved and also
